Image: Salih al-Ali (1883 – 13 April 1950) - Syrian Alawite military commander
who led the Alawite revolt of 1919–1921 against the French mandate of Syria.
We all know that many Sunnis fell into the trap of the Western psychological game that led them to drown in a deep sense of victimhood — believing they were the targets of a ‘Shia Crescent’ conspiracy, that they were no longer in power after the U.S. killed the leader of the Iraqi Sunnis, President Saddam Hussein, and their leader in Lebanon, Rafik Hariri.
The anger of the Sunnis was not directed at the United States, even though it was the one that killed these leaders, but rather redirected toward the Shia and the resistance. This was achieved by showcasing a few minor Iraqi Shia voices claiming to speak on behalf of the Shia, gloating over the Sunni losses and bragging about victory. Then, Sunni frustration was channeled into a reactionary stage — and from it, ISIS was born. The Sunni psyche lost its mind in ISIS to the point of frenzy.
Once the region had become ripe with sectarianism, the same tactic was moved to Syria. The feeling of Sunni victimhood was extended to Syrian Sunnis, who were deceived into believing they were oppressed. Old stories from Hama and Palmyra were repackaged as a conflict between Sunnis and Alawites, rather than what it truly was — a struggle between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Baathist and Syrian nationalist currents. The complexities of that era were left unexplained — even though half of the Assad family is Sunni, and the vast majority of state institutions are overwhelmingly Sunni. Still, the psychological operation was cleverly executed to convince people that non-Sunnis ruled everything.
After the destruction of the Sunni society in the Levant and its entrapment in fanaticism and religiosity — which was a reaction to the manufactured sense of persecution — Sunni identity began to be expressed through excessive religiosity. Through this, Wahhabis, Israelis, and Western intelligence infiltrated society and were welcomed in extremist Sunni circles. As a result, the Sunni sect began to disintegrate and detach from its Arab and national identity. Sunni Gaza came under grinding oppression while the Sunnis of the Levant watched as if it didn’t concern them. Their concern became focused on removing Iran from Syria, not Israel from Gaza. This meant that the Sunni mind became tolerant of the theft of Palestine and the killing of Gaza, but intolerant of any contact with Shia or Iranians.
This was an extraordinary success for the Western psychological warfare campaign, which severed the Sunnis from their national identity and turned them into allies in a sectarian conflict.
Following this impressive success, intelligence work began to focus on the destruction of the Alawite sect — not through physical destruction, but through cultural and psychological devastation: fragmenting the sect and undermining its national foundations. This covert operation began before the Syrian state fell, with online pages specifically targeting Alawites — portraying their situation as deteriorating due to Assad’s indifference to their livelihood and his wife’s alleged scheming against them.
After this campaign succeeded, the American plan in the Middle Eastern farm moved to dismantle the Alawite sect in a horrifying way. This preparation started two or three years before the state's collapse, when black ops rooms began spreading news, insults, and complaints suggesting that Alawites were fed up with their harsh living conditions. These operations redirected Alawite frustration toward President Assad and his wife, portraying her as a modern-day Marie Antoinette. This led to a weakening of the Alawite alignment with the Syrian national cause, as the propaganda claimed they were now the oppressed sect paying the price for Assad’s steadfastness — while his wife and family reaped the rewards and shared spoils with merchants.
In the mysterious phase following Assad's disappearance after the state's collapse, Western narratives insisted he had fled. Despite the impossibility of knowing the president’s fate in those final days, a wave of blame and hatred was directed at him, accusing him of abandoning his people and leaving his sect to face doom alone. This fostered immense disappointment and unparalleled blame, even without proof that Assad fled. Still, the black ops media persisted in portraying him as a deserter to obscure the truth about the international conspiracy that weakened the Syrian army and state.
The Alawites shifted from a position of national support, to a stance that equated patriotism with distancing themselves from Assad. Intelligence operations were activated: rabid elements from the Golan* were unleashed to retaliate against the Alawites — not as an end in itself but to isolate the Sunnis from them. The massacre created a blood-stained divide, pushing Alawites to seek survival just as the Sunnis had done. Calls for international protection began to emerge quickly, with some willing to offer anything in exchange for safety — because in this ‘Islamic farm,’ rabid dogs could be released on them at any moment.
Some Alawites began promoting the idea that the Sunnis did it — they succeeded through collaboration with the West, so why shouldn't we? And thus, the West extended one hand to the Sunnis, and another to the Alawites and Druze — and both sides seemed ready to offer any price. The Sunnis were ready to sell everything for power, while the Alawites were contemplating selling their national independence for protection.
This was evident when Trump exploited Jolani and his followers, threatening to support others instead. Behind the scenes, Trump’s administration communicated with Alawites through Congress members, hinting that while it wouldn’t tolerate Jolani forever, it expected something in return from them.
Pages run by Western and Israeli intelligence continue to proliferate strange ideas — all aimed at dismantling the Alawite sect and dividing it into warring factions with contradictory theories and solutions. Some blame Hafez al-Assad for putting the sect in conflict with the Sunnis and claim he shouldn’t have sought the presidency. Others spread rumors that he was Kurdish, not Alawite. Still others spin tales that he neglected his sect to keep it impoverished in service of his military authority.
Yet historically, the Alawites were among the poorest and most neglected groups before the Baath and Assad era. They rose along with Syria — and they helped lift Syria. Hafez al-Assad helped the sect by promoting education, which led to the Syrian coast having the highest rate of university degrees in the country. This created a well-educated, enlightened class that surpassed all others in academic attainment. But Assad couldn’t turn them into an economic elite — the Damascene and Aleppine elites were naturally and historically better suited to economic management due to geography, history, and experience.
The Alawite community, having lived in mountainous coastal areas without strategic agricultural or industrial development, couldn’t match that economic growth. Commerce and industry stayed concentrated in the major historical cities.
Still, simple-minded Alawites — just like simple-minded Sunnis — no matter their education level, were prone to rumors and gossip. They, too, fell into the trap the Sunnis had fallen into and began searching for a new identity and role. People like Edy Cohen began showing sympathy toward them in order to entrap them, exploiting the blindness of the Sunnis, who were fed a fake narrative of victimhood by the media.
Now, Mossad is trying to plant divisions within the Alawite sect to create environments similar to that of the Syrian revolution — where collaboration with Tel Aviv was open, such as the traitor Kamal al-Labwani, who proudly declared he sought Israeli support for the revolution. So now, Israel wants an Alawite version of Labwani — Alawite revolutionaries modeled after the pro-NATO Sunni rebels.
The Alawites — this great sect that elevated Syria and gave it its Umayyad legacy, that lifted Syria into regional power and world balance — are now being targeted to devour themselves, abandon their national legacy, and shed their unique cultural heritage drawn from the spirit of Ali and their national identity. Because of their historical isolation, they represent the purest form of Syrian identity.
The ‘black rooms’ that claim to speak for them have suddenly emerged and spread like fungus — all aiming to manufacture leaders and personalities, like those created in Sunni society to divide the Sunnis, who now are scattered and in pitiful condition, led by figures like Um Ahmad (who raised a slipper as a symbol of freedom), the terrorist Jolani, and Marhaf Abu Qasra.
These currents will eventually tear the Alawite community apart, creating clashing factions and leaders whose interest lies in selling out the sect and its positions. Electronic bots work tirelessly to fracture the Alawite sect and create extremist and delusional trends within it.
Listen to the buzzing, O Syrian… and know that if you don’t stop the flies and mosquitoes, you’ll get malaria — just like the Sunni community did. And this malaria will spread and contaminate the blood across all of Syria.
(*) During the proxy war on Syria, some jihadist groups operated in the Golan region
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